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Symposium II: Necessary Conditions
ology since these theorists appear to have an elective affinity
for this kind of thinking and causal explanation (see Mahoney
2004 for a discussion in the context of comparative-historical
methods and theory). Many of the important works of
comparative politics and sociology can be cited in this regard:
classics such as Radcliffe-Brown (1952), Lipset (1959),
Malinowski (1944), Gerschenkron (1962), Moore (1966), and
Skocpol (1979), and more recent work in the same tradition
such as Downing (1992), Goodwin (2001), Jacoby (2000), Linz
and Stepan (1996), Waldner (1999), and Weldon (2002).
Typical of qualitative-comparative studies is a desire to
explain individual cases. While good scholars have always
been interested in theories that work in multiple settings, there
is a constant concern among qualitative theorists that the
theory work well for central cases. If a theory of revolution
does not work well for the French or Russian Revolution then
it will not be well-received even if it does very well on other,
historically prominent cases. To use Ragin’s terminology,
qualitative scholars are more case-oriented than variable-
oriented quantitative scholars, who are generally unconcerned
about how well their theories work for any given observation.
There is no doubt that causal explanations in individual cases
often apply the basic necessary condition counterfactual “if
X had not occurred or been present then Y would not have
occurred” (see Goertz and Levy 2004 for extensive examples
from the literatures on the causes of World War I and the end
of the Cold War). In short, historical counter-factuals often
take the necessary condition form.
One cannot dismiss the affinity of qualitative scholars
for necessary conditions on the basis of lack of rigorous
thinking. Prominent necessary condition hypotheses occur
(though perhaps less frequently) in formal and game-theoretic
work; for example, they occupy the core of Bueno de
Mesquita’s most influential work (1981; Bueno de Mesquita
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That necessary condition hypotheses are deterministic
forms part of the methodological and theoretical folk wisdom
of the social sciences. When mentioned, it usually serves as
means for a quick dismissal of the hypothesis in question, or
as a segue to other issues. This essay proposes that the folk
theorem “necessary conditions are deterministic” avoids the
central issues which are causal mechanisms, functional form,
and testing philosophy. These are the core topics since the
two corollaries of necessary condition folk theorem are that
(1) one counter-example suffices to reject a necessary
condition hypothesis and (2) the world is probabilistic and
hence deterministic theories are not useful. The first claim is
about empirical testing philosophy, what one could call a naive
falsificationist view.2 The second deals with the nature of the
world, what Hall (2003) calls an ontological position about
what kinds of theories will be most useful to (social) scientists.
I shall argue that the folk theorem about necessary condition
hypotheses and its two corollaries do not survive serious
analysis.
The character of necessary condition hypotheses merits
debates since they arise with great regularity in social science
(see Goertz 2003 for a list of 150 of them, representing a wide
range of substantive areas and methodological orientations).
It is all the more important for qualitative theory and method-
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and Lalman 1992). Other examples include Riker and Sened
(1991), Pahre (1997), Krehbiel (1985), Niou, Ordeshook, and
Rose (1989), and Taylor (1987). Formal theory almost by its
very nature produces theorems containing necessary
conditions.
The Appendix to this essay provides a small sample of
prominent necessary condition hypotheses. As it illustrates,
they arise across the complete range of N, large, small, and
case study. They occur in theoretical perspectives ranging
from game theory to social constructivism. However, there
does appear to exist a particular affinity between qualitative
scholars and necessary condition hypotheses. Roughly, as
the N of the study increases, the more likely it is that the
author will express hypotheses in probabilistic language.
Conversely, in small-N or case studies one is much more likely
to find causal explanations using necessary and sufficient
condition language. In short, necessary condition
hypotheses, their theoretical status, and how they are to be
evaluated empirically deserve attention, particularly within
the context of qualitative methods.
What is the Status and Usefulness of Deterministic Theories?
It is useful to situate the specific claim about necessary
conditions as deterministic within the larger context of
deterministic theories in general. We can provisionally define
as deterministic all theories that do not have an explicit
probabilistic or stochastic component (this need not
necessarily be an error term).
Lieberson (1991; 2004; see also Goldthorpe 1997, 6) pro-
vides an example of someone for whom the fact that the
methodology/theory is deterministic serves as grounds for
criticism and rejection. He has repeatedly argued that Ragin’s
methodologies–Boolean (1987) and fuzzy-set (2000)–are not
useful because they are deterministic. Lieberson is thus
applying what I have called the ontological corollary to the
deterministic folk theorem. He sees the world as probabilistic
in nature, hence deterministic methodologies have lesser, if
any, value.
If, however, one surveys the natural and social sciences,
there is a large range of nonprobabilistic theories that have
been extremely useful and/or influential over the centuries
and recent decades. Natural sciences had a history of success,
e.g., Newtonian physics, long before probability theory was
even invented. Calculus and differential equations have been
widely applied in the natural sciences and have a long tradition
in economics. Within international relations one cannot forget
the groundbreaking work of Richardson on arms races (1960;
for other and recent applications of dynamic equation models,
see Kadera 2001). Much of game theory is deterministic. It
seems hard to deny the usefulness of deterministic models in
general. It can be claimed that set theory and logic (i.e., the
mathematics of necessary conditions) are not useful for
explaining or modeling social phenomena, but it cannot be on
the grounds of determinism.
We can think of different kinds of mathematics as
representing different kinds of causal mechanisms or
explanations. More concretely, we can present this as a debate
about functional form. Suppose we take two different determin-
istic models:
Y = B0 + B1X1        (1)
X is necessary for Y        (2)
For a given phenomenon we can ask which is a better
model or explanation. We can ask if the algebra and calculus
of equation (1) works better than the logic and set theory of
equation (2). Clearly, the linear (and additive, if more variables
are included) model of equation (1) is familiar to students of
statistics, while the mathematics of equation (2) are rarely
taught.3 Presented in this manner, the fact that both equations
are deterministic hardly seems relevant to assessing the value
of competing models.
Evaluating Deterministic Models
A key corollary of the deterministic folk theorem involves
the claim that one counter-example suffices to reject a
necessary condition hypothesis. We can ask two questions
in this regard:  First, is that a reasonable testing philosophy?
and second, is that how deterministic theories are usually
tested? But this avoids the most important question: which
explanation, equation (1) or equation (2), fits the data better?
Since equations (1) and (2) represent different functional forms
(i.e., different causal mechanisms), we can skip philosophy
and move to the pragmatic question of comparing theory to
data. Figures 1 and 2 illustrate situations where the data fit
each theory well. If the linear causal mechanism generates the
data then we would see the data scattered as in Figure 1; if the
causal mechanism involves necessary conditions, then we
should see a scatter plot like that in Figure 2 (see Mahoney
2004 for a similar discussion). The differences between these
scatter plots reflect the fact that we have different causal
explanations and different functional forms.
In terms of fit, the data in Figure 2 fit the necessary
condition hypothesis of equation (2) much better than the
data of Figure 1 fit the linear model of equation (1). The
deterministic linear model requires all the data points to lie on
the line. In contrast, the necessary condition hypothesis as
modeled by fuzzy sets requires that all points lie on or below
the X = Y diagonal (see Ragin 2000 for an extensive discussion
of this). While most of the points lie near the line not that many
lie on it in Figure 1, while in Figure 2 only three points (indicated
by “?”) lie above the diagonal.4
One would not reject the necessary condition hypothesis
just because there are three points that are above the diagonal,
just as one would find that the data in Figure 1 quite strongly
support the linear model even though most of the points are
not on the line (R2 = .85) This is true for the real-life testing of
all deterministic theories. One does not expect them to fit
perfectly; researchers are satisfied if the data are “close
enough” to what the theory expects. In summary, the one
counterexample and reject corollary is never applied to
deterministic theories, and there is no reason to apply it to
necessary condition ones.
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Figure 1: Linear Functional Form
Figure 2: Necessary Condition Functional Form
(from Fuzzy Sets)
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Are Necessary Condition Hypotheses Deterministic?
The previous sections have addressed the corollaries of
the folk theorem that necessary condition hypotheses are
deterministic, but I have yet to address the theorem itself. One
might say that by my own definition of deterministic theories–
i.e., no explicit probabilistic components–it is clear that the
answer to the question must be yes. I would like to suggest in
this section that things are not so clear as they might seem.
I have stressed throughout this short essay that what we
should be focusing on is causal explanations, mechanisms,
and functional form. If we can express the basic causal claim
of a necessary condition in statistical or probabilistic language,
then the whole debate would tend to become relatively moot.
One can take the analogy of algebra and geometry. Many
theorems of algebra can be expressed geometrically and vice
versa. Is the same true of necessary condition hypotheses?
Expressing necessary condition hypotheses in probabil-
istic terms is the tack taken by Braumoeller and Goertz (2000).
As far as I can tell no one contests the following as either a
definition of a dichotomous necessary condition hypothesis
or as a direct implication of it:
P(X = 1|Y = 1) = 1        (3)
If X is necessary for Y, then whenever Y occurs we must
find that X preceded it.5 One might object that I am playing
with words here since determinism can be phrased as
“probability equals 1.” The question I would like to raise here
is “does the nature of causal explanation change when the
probability is .99?” A variety of authors suggest that there is
not a dramatic difference. Little says: “If C is a necessary
condition for E, then the probability of E in the absence of C is
zero (P(E|¬C) = 0). If C is a sufficient condition for E, then the
probability of E in the presence of C is one (P(E|C) = 1). And
we can introduce parallel concepts that are the statistical
analogues of necessary and sufficient conditions. C is an
enhancing causal factor just in case P(E|C) > P(E), and C is an
inhibiting causal factor just in case P(E|C) < P(E). The extreme
case of an inhibiting factor is the absence of a necessary
condition, and the extreme case of an enhancing causal factor
is a sufficient condition” (Little 1991, 27; for a similar treatment
see Owens 1992: 5).6
Sometimes, however, the move from a deterministic to a
probabilistic model can have major consequences. One
characteristic of game-theoretic models is that situations of
uncertainty often have quite different strategic properties than
do situations of certainty. For example, Morton (1999)
discusses spatial voting models where there are significant
differences between deterministic models and probabilistic
ones. As a result, the whole theory changes, and we would
not say that the case where the probability is 1.00 is basically
the same as when the probability is .99. At the same time, I
think there are many situations where the basic hypothesis
does really not change much when one moves from “with
certainty” to “is extremely likely.”
One way to see if the move from 1.00 to .99 matters is to
examine how testing of deterministic theories is conducted
for point hypotheses similar to equation (3). One large body
of literature comes from experimental economic studies of
bargaining behavior (e.g., Roth 1995 for a survey; see Morton
1999 for a lengthy discussion of point predictions in formal
models). Frequently the expected utility model (deterministic)
predicts a unique equilibrium behavior. Often in the context of
prisoners’ dilemma–like situations it is no cooperation by any-
one. One of the notable findings of this literature is how often
people cooperate when the theory says they should not (often
up to 50 percent do). Economists work hard to get this
percentage down, and consider themselves successful if
cooperation rates are less than 20 percent.7 Certainly the
experimental economists do not make a big difference between
a couple of percentage points: for them .99 is not significantly
different from 1.00.
Another possibility is to express the basic ideas of
Boolean logic (e.g., logical ANDs and ORs) in probabilistic
terms. Cioffi-Revilla and Starr (2003; see also Cioffi-Revilla
1998; see Braumoeller 2003 for some statistics) model complex
necessary and sufficient condition theories in probabilistic
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terms. They are extremely clear about the use of Boolean logic
and hence necessary and/or sufficient conditions. For
example,
AXIOM 1 (First-Order Causality: Political Necessity). A
political behavior event B in U occurs when W and O occur.
Formally, B is defined by the causal equation
B = W AND O        (4)
where the Boolean AND connective stands for the formal
logic conjunction (i.e., “W AND O are necessary conditions
for B”).
THEOREM 1 (First-Order Probability of Political
Behavior). The first-order probability of political behavior
B(W,O) is equal to the product of the probability of
willingness W and the probability of opportunity O.
Formally,
Pr(B) = Pr(W     O) = Pr(W) × Pr(O)                         (5)
B = WO        (6)
    = P2        (7)
in the special case where P = W = O.
It is extremely useful to have the basic claims of a
necessary condition hypothesis expressed in probabilistic or
statistical terms. This brings out even more clearly the
fundamental differences in functional form. The Braumoeller
and Goertz (2000) approach also illustrates the differences
between a necessary condition hypothesis and typical
statistical ones once they are speaking the same language.
The hypothesis expressed in equation (3) is a point prediction,
p = 1.00, or a narrow range prediction, i.e., p ~ 1. Contrast this
with the typical null hypothesis model where the alternative
hypothesis (what the researcher wants to prove) is typically p
= .5, or p > .5.
In expressing necessary condition hypotheses in different
forms, I have shown that they have a variety of testable
implications (e.g., point hypotheses, triangular scatterplots,
counterfactual hypotheses). This should be the focus of the
methodological discussion. The folk theorem and its two
corollaries about the determinism of necessary condition
hypotheses crumble under analysis. Many have applied
standards of theory and testing to necessary condition
hypotheses that would never be applied to other deterministic
hypotheses. At the same time, it is clear that the basic claims
of necessary condition hypotheses can be expressed in
probabilistic or statistical terms. The title of this essay posed
a question; the answer is “no, it usually does not matter.”
Appendix
1. “The expected utility model provides a framework from which
at least several significant, several lesser, deductions about
the necessary conditions for war have been made. . . . (Bueno
de Mesquita 1981: 92) The results just reported strongly
support the proposition that positive expected utility is
necessary–though not sufficient–for a leader to initiate a
serious international dispute, including a war.” (ibid: 129)
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2. “The concept of historical prerequisites of modern
industrialization is a rather curious one. Certain major obstacles
to industrialization must be removed and certain things
propitious to it must be created before industrialization can
begin. . . Along with it goes the idea of the uniformity of
industrial development in the sense that every industrialization
necessarily must be based on the same set of preconditions”
(Gerschenkron 1962: 31; note that the title of the essay is
“Reflections on the concept of ‘prerequisites’ of modern
industrialization”).
3. “Theorem 4.1: Communication leads to enlightenment if
and only if: 1. the speaker is persuasive, 2. only the speaker
initially possesses the knowledge that the principal needs,
and 3. neither common interests nor external forces induce the
speaker to reveal what he knows” (Lupia and McCubbins
1998: 69).
4. Kiser and Levi (1996: 189–90) describing Moore, Skocpol,
and Goldstone:
Moore: Only where there was a relatively strong
bourgeoisie independent of the state and only where the
aristocracy and peasantry either sided with the
bourgeoisie or were negligible was there a revolution that
led to democracy.
Skocpol: Only where there are pressures on states due to
wars and international competition and only where these
pressures result in a conjuncture of fiscal crisis, abandon-
nment of the state by the dominant classes, and peasant
revolts based in strong peasant communities is there the
possibility of a social revolution.
Goldstone: Only where there have been demographic
shifts and increasing demographic pressures that create
political stress (elite competition, fiscal crisis, and mass
mobilization potential based on concentration of youth)
will there be state breakdown. When the cultural framework
permits the development of an elite ideology committed
to innovation there will be a revolution.
5. “To recapitulate, the Sarajevo assassinations changed the
political and psychological environment in Vienna and Berlin
in six important ways, all of which were probably necessary
for the decisions that led to war” (Lebow 2000: 605).
6. “Clearly, the necessary but not sufficient conditions for
major war emerge only in the rare instances when power parity
is accompanied by a challenger overtaking a dominant nation.
The odds of a war in this very reduced subset are 50 percent.
No other theoretical statement has, to our knowledge, reduced
the number of cases to such a small set, and no other is so
parsimonious in its explanatory requirements.” (Organski and
Kugler 1989: 179).
7. “By ‘design principle’ I mean an essential element or
condition that helps to account for the success of these
institutions [common pool resource] in sustaining the common
pool resources and gaining the compliance of generation after
generation of appropriators to the rules in use. . . I am willing
to speculate. . . [that] it will be possible to identify a set of
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91).
8. “In this study, I shall argue that people go out into the
streets and protest in response to deeply felt grievances and
opportunities. But this produces a protest cycle only when
structure cleavages are both deep and visible and when
opportunities for mass protest are opened up by the political
system” (Tarrow 1989: 13).
9. “Expressed as a necessary condition, my argument is that
the absence of high levels of elite conflict is necessary for
sustained economic development and industrial trans-
formation” (Waldner (1999: 16; see also Figure 1).
10. “Decline was a necessary condition of change [in Soviet
policy], but clearly insufficient to determine the precise nature
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Notes
1
 I would like to thank Bear Braumoeller, Lars-Erik Cederman,
Claudio Cioffi-Revilla, Jim Mahoney, and Charles Ragin for com-
ments on an earlier draft of this paper.
2 For example, “When we say ‘If X1 then Y ,’ we are making a
deterministic statement. When we say, ‘The presence of X1 increases
the likelihood or frequency of Y,’ we are making a probabilistic state-
ment. Obviously, if given the choice, deterministic statements are
more appealing. They are cleaner, simpler, and more easily disproved
than probabilistic ones. One negative case (Y’s absence in the pres-
ence of X1) would quickly eliminate a deterministic statement”
(Lieberson 1997, 364; see also 2004). Alker makes the same claim:
“The easily falsifiable nature of necessary and/or sufficiency argu-
ments – all that is required is a counter-example – is surely one of the
most at-tractive features of requisites analysis from an empirical
point of view” (Alker 1970, 879).
3
 In philosophy of course it is the opposite, everyone learns
logic but only a small subset learn probability and statistics.
4 It is thus not surprising that when two different functional
forms are applied to the same data that one can get different results
(e.g., Koenig-Archibugi 2004).
5 Among other things, it is this fact that Dion (2003) utilizes to
argue that selecting on the dependent variable is legitimate for neces-
sary conditions. The typical statistical model is of the form E(Y|X),
in contrast the necessary cause model conditions on Y not X.
6 Elster sees scientific laws has having a sufficient condition
form: “a [covering, scientific] law has the form “IF conditions C1,C2,
. . . ,C
n
 obtain, THEN always E” (1999, 5). As is typical, he is more
interested in the “always” aspect of this definition of covering laws
than the sufficient condition functional form.
7 In comparison the Braumoeller and Goertz (2000) or Ragin
(2000) probabilistic standards are much more stringent.
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It Ain’t Necessarily So—Or Is It?
David Waldner
University of Virginia
daw4h@virginia.edu
Scholars who have couched their propositions in the form
of necessary conditions owe a great debt to Gary Goertz for his
recent work evaluating the status of claims to necessity and
developing methods for testing them. In his most recent essay,
Goertz makes a powerful case that necessary conditions hy-
potheses can reasonably be understood as probabilistic, not
deterministic. Goertz suggests two benefits from this
reconceptualization: necessary conditions hypotheses are more
likely to get a fair hearing from social scientists who would
otherwise dismiss them as deterministic, and those hypoth-
eses will not be held hostage to single counter-examples that
would unfairly be taken as disconfirming when in fact they
likely represent measurement error.
But I think that the pragmatic benefits might be accompa-
nied by some less-welcome implications. And I worry that
switching to probabilistic language threatens connotative con-
fusion. Taken together, these concerns make me reluctant to
embrace Goertz’s otherwise attractive position.
Define a necessary condition hypothesis as P(X/Y) = 1.
Since P can vary between 0 and 1, it appears arbitrary to treat
the range 0 to .99 as a homogeneous set contrasted sharply
with P = 1. Why should the step from .99 to 1 constitute a
threshold qualitatively different from the step between .98 to
.99? Thus, Goertz argues, we suffer no loss of propositional
meaning when we think of necessary conditions as “extremely
likely” but not certain. Fine, but once we make necessity proba-
bilistic, what prevents us from adopting, as Charles Ragin has
advocated, other linguistic qualifiers, such as “usually neces-
sary” or “necessary more often than not?  As James Mahoney
recently commented,
Empirically speaking, it is clearly useful to know if some
